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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON INDEBTEDNESS
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MISSOURI
INTRODUCTION
For many years states have been faced with the problem of con-
trolling the indebtedness incurred by their local political units." When
a unit becomes "excessively indebted," local taxes very often become
extremely high and few benefits are realized by the taxpayers; the
bulk of the local revenue is expended in an attempt to reduce the debt,
or in discharging the interest as it becomes due. In order to alleviate
the problem of over-indebtedness of local units, states have imposed
constitutional limitations on the power of local units to incur financial
obligations. The principal objective of these provisions is to limit the
amount of indebtedness a unit may incur in excess of its current
revenue and income.
Constitutional limitations on indebtedness fall into four categories.
The first allows a unit to incur unlimited indebtedness when approved
by the qualified voters in the unit.' A second type limits the indebted-
ness to a stated percentage of the assessed valuation of tangible prop-
erty in the unit.4 The third type provides a limitation based on a fixed
percentage of the assessed property valuation, and a higher percent-
age limitation on approval of the qualified voters.5 The fourth type,
found in Missouri, limits the indebtedness above current revenue and
income to a fixed percentage of the assessed property valuation when
approved by the qualified voters.*
The first constitutional limitation on indebtedness of local units in
Missouri was embodied in the Constitution of 1875.7 The need for such
a constitutional provision which would put local units on a cash basis
stemmed from a realization that many local units were, at the time, in
1. See Stason, State Adnzinistrave Supervision of Mwnicipal Indebtedness, 30
MIoTi. L. Rrv. 833, 833-37 (1932).
2. See notes 3-6 infra.
See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
4. See, e.g., AL, A. CONST. art. 12, § 224.
5. See, e.g., NEB. CoNsT. art. XIII, §§ 1-2.
(. See, e.g., Mo. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 26(a)-(b).
7. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 12 (1875). There was no similar section in the Consti-
tution of 1865. BRADSHAW, COUNTY GOVERNMENT MANUAL FOR THE MISSOURI CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1943, at 55 (1943).
"Local government" and "local unit" as used throughout this note include the
counties, cities, incorporated towns or villages, school districts, and other political
corporations and subdivisions of the state.
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near ruinous financial condition 8 due to poor administration by local
officials,9 poor investments in railroads,10 and the depression of 1873.11
Since 1875 the Missouri Supreme Court has been called upon to de-
termine whether the obligations incurred by local units under a va-
riety of financing devices are debts which would cause the unit to
exceed the constitutional limitation.'2 The court has permitted use of
certain of these devices while the use of others has been prohibited on
the ground that they create indebtedness beyond the constitutional
limitation. The purpose of this note is to examine the various devices
used by local units and the obligations incurred thereunder, with par-
ticular regard to their treatment by the court, in an effort to deter-
mine the effectiveness of the constitutional provisions.
Two provisions of the Missouri Constitution are of peculiar sig-
nificance to the discussion which follows. Article VI, section 26 (a),
provides:
No county, city, incorporated town or village, school district or
other political corporation or subdivision of the state shall become
indebted in an amount exceeding in any year the income and
revenue provided for such year plus any unencumbered balances
from previous years, except as otherwise provided in this consti-
tution.
Under this provision if an obligation is incurred and the current reve-
nue and income or unencumbered balances from previous years is not
sufficient to meet it, the obligation is void unless the unit has complied
with the provisions of article VI, section 26 (b) which provides:
Any county, city, incorporated town or village, school district
or other political corporation or subdivision of the state, by vote
of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting thereon, may
become indebted in an amount not to exceed five per cent of the
value of taxable tangible property therein as shown by the last
completed assessment for state and county purposes.
8. The inclusion in the Constitution of 1865 of a provision on indebtedness of
local units was characteristic of this period of history. The people did not have
faith in the legislature and, accordingly, the legislative power over finances, as
well as other areas, was restricted by the constitution. LOEB, Constitutions and
Constitutional Conventions in Missouri, in 1 JOURNAL MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1875, at 25-42 (1920).
9. See Barnard & Co. v. Knox County, 105 Mo. 382, 16 S.W. 917 (1891);
Holmes, Constitutional Limitations Upon Municipal Debt in Missouri, 6 U. KAN.
CITY L. Rav. 85, 93 (1937).
10. In re Barnard & Co., supra note 9; BRADSHAW, op. cit. supra note 7, at 14;
Holmes, supra note 9, at 91-92.
11. LOEB, op. cit. supra note 8, at 25-42; Holmes, supra note 9, at 93.
12. "Obligation" and "debt," as used in this note, are used in a technical sense:
"Obligation" is used to denote any situation in which the unit is financially obli-
gated-whether or not the amount would exceed the constitutional limitation.
"Debt" is used to denote a situation in which an "obligation" will cause the unit
to exceed its constitutional limitation.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss1/8
NOTES
INVOLUNTARILY INCURRED DEBTS
1. Obligations Incurred by Performance of Mandatory Duties
A unit, of course, incurs many obligations as a result of its execu-
tive or administrative officers performing various duties. These duties
have been classified as either mandatory or voluntary. A mandatory
duty, as distinguished from a voluntary or discretionary duty, is one
which has been prescribed by the constitution or state legislature. An
initial problem that arises is whether the constitutional limitation is
applicable to render void obligations incurred as the result of the per-
formance of a mandatory duty.
In Potter v. Douglas County," an obligation was incurred as a result
of the sheriff (plaintiff) of another county keeping and transporting
prisoners of Douglas County (defendant). At the time the sheriff pre-
sented his bill, the defendant had already expended all its current rev-
enue so that the only method of paying the bill was by issuance of war-
rants in excess of revenue and income for that year. The court stated
that the constitutional limitation did not apply to "debts of law"-i.e.,
debts incurred in the performance of mandatory duties.14 The court
was influenced by the fact that the amount for expenses of this type
could not be ascertained in advance of its incurrence and consequently
the county would neither be able to budget the expense nor get the
consent of two-thirds of the voters prior to its incurrence.
Six years later the Potter case was expressly overruled by Barnad
& Co. v. Knox County. - The county clerk, in the performance of a
mandatory duty, obligated the county by purchasing stationery. War-
rants were issued to the plaintiff-seller at a time when previously-
issued warrants exceeded current income. Heavily influenced by the
factors which led to the adoption of the constitutional provision-
corruption and ineconomy-the court refused to give "debts of law"
preferential treatment, stating that the limitation "includes indebted-
ness in any manner or for any purpose." The debt, therefore, was
held void. It would seem that under the Barnard case funds necessary
for the operation of the local government could be subjected to the
mercy or whim of the local administrators. If these officials choose to
spend current revenue in the performance of their discretionary
duties prior to the incurrence of expenses necessary for the perform-
V-. 97 Mo. 239 (1885).
14. The court stated that the debt limitation was applicable only to debts in-
curred "through the ordinary channel, the action of the county court, the financial
agent of the county." Id. at 244. See also George D. Barnard & Co. v. Knox
County, 37 Fed. 563 (E.D. Mo. 1889).
15. 105 Mo. 382, 16 S.W. 917 (1891).
16. Id. at 389, 16 S.W. at 919.
The performance of discretionary duties has always created obligations which
may be proscribed by the constitutional limitation. Linn Consol. High School
Dist. v. Pointer's Creek Pub. School Dist., 356 Mo. 798, 203 S.W.2d 721 (1947);
Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. 246 (1885).
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ance of mandatory duties, it is hardly likely that necessary services
will be rendered to the unit when it will not be obligated to pay for
them.
The court in later decisions, however, has not been so quick to de-
clare "debts of law" invalid when current funds have been spent or
obligated in the performance of discretionary duties. In Gill v. County
of Buchanan,17 involving salaries of county officials, the court was of
the opinion that "no part of any such obligation could become invalid
because the county court decided to incur other obligations for differ-
ent purposes during the year."' If the total obligations exceeded
current revenue and income so that all obligations could not be vali-
dated, debts arising from the performance of discretionary duties
would be invalidated to the extent that the obligations exceed the
constitutional limitation. This applies even though the "discretion-
ary" debts are incurred prior to the "debts of law." In State ex rel.
Taylor v. Wade,19 a mandamus action to force the county to publish a
financial statement in accord with sections 13827-28, Missouri Revised
Statutes (1939), the county contended that, as the income and antici-
pated income for the year had been obligated, the amount necessary
to publish the statement would be the creation of a debt proscribed by
the constitution. The court, refusing to let executive and administra-
tive officials defeat their duties created by the legislature, held that
obligations incurred through performance of mandatory duties have
priority over obligations incurred through performance of discretion-
ary duties. Therefore, the report had to be published and its cost was
a valid debt taking preference over the obligations incurred in the
performance of discretionary duties. These latter cases indicate a
tendency by the court, in determining the constitutional validity of
debts, to validate obligations incurred in the performance of discre-
tionary duties only where there is an excess of current revenue or in-
come above the amount needed to pay "debts of law.' ' 20 This is
especially true if the amount of a "debt of law" is reasonably ascer-
tainable at the beginning of the year.
Under the Potter case obligations incurred in the performance of
discretionary duties which arose prior to the incurrence of a "debt of
law" remained valid if there were current funds to pay them when
incurred. Also, the "debt of law" subsequently incurred was validated
even though the incurrence put the unit beyond the debt limit pre-
scribed in the constitution. On the other hand, under the Barnard case
"debts of law" were given no preference. The more recent cases seem
17. 346 Mo. 599, 142 S.W.2d 665 (1940) (county judge recovered salary for the
year 1934).
18. Id. at 605, 142 S.W.2d at 668.
19. 360 Mo. 895, 231 S.W.2d 179,(1950).
20. See Holmes, supra note 9, at 101-05.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss1/8
NOTES
much sounder than either the Potter or Barnard case for the unit is
compelled to pay for the performance of the necessary functions of the
unit-"debts of law"-but still must confine its expenditures within
the constitutional limit. Thus, the court, by giving preference to
"debts of law,' '21 has avoided their evasion and the constitutional pro-
vision has remained effective.
2. Judgment Debts Arising from Ex Delicto Actions
Debts arising from acts ex delicto do not fall within the constitu-
tional limitation.2 In Conner v. City of Nevada,23 the city defended a
tort action arising from the defective condition of its street on the
ground that the city's indebtedness had already reached the constitu-
tional limit. The court held that by the language of article X, section
12,' the limitation is to be applied only to indebtedness incurred by
assent, agreement, or contract. The word "indebted" was held to refer
to debts ex contractu as distinguished from debts arising from tort
liability. A claim for damages reduced to a judgment debt is incur-
rence of a debt in only a most technical sense, said the court, and one
not intended to be included within the purview of the constitutional
limitation.
The wording of the constitutional limitation would seem to be suffi-
ciently broad to cover debts ex deticto. It should be recalled, however,
that one of the main objectives of the constitutional provision was to
eliminate corruption and inefficiency. While it may be possible for
corrupt public officers to gain benefits at the expense of the taxpayer
in the performance of various duties which obligate the unit ex con-
tractu, problems of corruption and inefficiency of operation have little
or nothing to do with incurrence of tort liability. Furthermore, if the
framers of the constitution intended that the limitation should apply
to debts ex delicto, they could have so stated expressly when drafting
the Constitution of 1945.
VOLUNTARILY ASSUMED OBLIGATIONS
1. Payment Out of Special Funds
Although the unit may have assumed the obligation voluntarily, i.e.,
without compulsion of law-statutory or judicial-the obligation may
not come within the constitutional limitation on indebtedness where
21. Preference has also been given to "debts of law" in another way: an ob-
ligation voluntarily assumed is void if beyond the revenue actually received,
whereas a "debt of law" is valid if within the revenue which could have been pro-
vided. Linn Consol. High School Dist. v. Pointer's Creek Pub. School Dist., 356
Mo. 798, 203 S.1.2d 721 (1947).
22. State ex rel. Pyle v. University City, 320 Mo. 451, 8 S.W.2d 73 (1928);
Conner v. City of Nev ada, 188 Mo. 148, 86 S.W. 256 (1905); Smith v. City of St.
Joseph, 122 Mo. 643, 27 S.W. 344 (1894).
23. 188 Mo. 148, 86 S.W. 256 (1905).
24. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 12 (1875).
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the general revenue and income of the local unit is not obligated.to
discharge the debt. The court has adopted the "special fund" doc-
trine: where the debt is to be paid out of a special fund which is
neither raised nor replenished by taxation, the constitutional limita-
tion is not applicable.25 The units have taken advantage of this doc-
trine to finance many large projects, such as sewerage systems, water-
works, and electric power plants, the cost of which would otherwise be
beyond their financial limits as prescribed by the constitution.
a. Payment wit& Revenue from the Financed Project
A unit may obtain funds to finance a particular project by issuing
revenue bonds-bonds the principal and interest of which are to be
paid solely from the revenue received from the project so financed.
For example, in State ex rel. Hannibal v. Smith,28 bonds issued to
finance the construction of a bridge were to be paid wholly from
bridge tolls. The city was not obligated to pay any part of the princi-
pal or interest out of its general revenue funds, nor did the bond-
holders secure a lien on other city property. The court held that since
the bonds were secured and payable only from the revenues to be
realized from the particular project purchased with the proceeds of
the bonds, they did not create a debt within the meaning of the con-
stitutional provisions. Since neither taxation nor income from other
property owned by the unit need be resorted to to pay the debt, it is
submitted that the limitation has been correctly held inapplicable.
A more difficult problem arises where the unit jledges the entire
revenue from a project to pay an indebtedness which exists only in
relation to part of the project. For example, the unit may issue reve-
nue bonds to cover the cost of additions and improvements to an exist-
ing utility and pledge the income of the entire utility to pay the in-
debtedness, 2r i.e., the income resulting from the extension or improve-
ment plus the income from the existing project. Or, the city may
finance a completely new project by outright purchase of part of the
system (perhaps through the issuance of bonds within the debt limi-
tation) and issuance of revenue bonds to pay the balance, pledging
the income from the entire plant to pay the bonds. 28 The court, in Bell
25. Holmes, supra note 9, at 112-13.
26. 335 Mo. 825, 74 S.W.2d 367 (1934). See also City of Maryville v. Cushman,
363 Mo. 87, 249 S.W.2d 347 (1952) (financed combined waterworks and sewerage
system with proceeds from sale of revenue bonds); State ex Tel. City of Excelsior
Springs v. Smith, 336 Mo. 1104, 82 S.W.2d 37 (1935) (construction of a mineral
water system).
27. See, e.g., Woodmansee v. Kansas City, 346 Mo. 919, 144 S.W.2d 137 (1940)
(bonds issued to enlarge and modernize market facilities to be paid'from revenue
of the facilities after renovation).
28. See, e.g., Grossman v. Public Water Supply Dist., 339 Mo. 344, 96 S.W.2d
701 (1936) (financed the utility by issuing both general bonds as provided in the
constitution and revenue bonds).
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v. City of Fayette,2-°" took notice of such a situation, and in dictum in-
dicated that it might adopt the "segregation of funds" doctrine-i.e.,
failure to segregate funds from the existing project makes the debt
one proscribed by the constitution since the revenue from the existing
project might be considered part of the unit's general revenue funds.
When the issue was squarely presented to the court in Grossman v.
Public Water Supply Dist.- and City of Lebanon v. Schneider,1 how-
ever, it rejected the "segregation of funds" doctrine. The court feli
the improvements were necessary and that the existing facilities or
that part that could be constructed by outright purchase would be in-
adequate and worthless without the additions. Thus, if only the in-
come of the utility is resorted to to pay the obligation, the constitu-
tional limitation is inapplicable. It is submitted that, although this is
indirectly obligating general funds of the unit-obligating funds prior
to their becoming a part of the general fund-the result is sound in
practice, for it allows the unit to utilize an otherwise inadequate or
worthless plant.
A further problem is presented if a unit pays for services, such as
light, power, and water, which it receives as a consumer from a utility
financed by means of a "special fund." As this is indirectly obligating
tax revenue, the court has been quick to find a "debt" within the con-
stitutional sense and has prevented such expenditures.32 The court
has reasoned that the amount the unit pays for use of the service of
the project comes from the general tax fund, and therefore, because
the "special fund" includes monies raised by taxation or which must
be replenished by taxation, the "special fund" doctrine is inapplica-
ble, i.e., the purchase price of the utility is held to be an obligation of
the local unit.- From a practical standpoint this view seems inappro-
priate. One need only use a little imagination to go behind the re-
ported facts to see that the seller-contractor wants to be sure that
there will be sufficient revenue collected, and his best assurance is for
the unit to pay for what it uses. If the unit has sufficient current reve-
nue there exists no reason why it should not pay for that which it uses
if the amount is fair and reasonables4 for under these circumstances,
the unit would be required to pay a similar price for power, water,
or light from a plant in which it did not have an interest, in which
29. :125 Mo. 75, 28 S.W.2d 356 (1930) (conditional sale of two engines to be
paid oe from earnings of same-distinguishing situation where funds of entire
plant are used).
:3. :339 Mo. :344, 96 S.W.2d 701 (1936).
31. :349 Mo. 712, 163 S.W.2d 588 (1942).
:32. Sager v. City of Stanberry, 336 Mo. 213, 78 S.W.2d 431 (1934); Hagler v.
City of Salem, 333 Mo. 330, 62 S.W.2d 751 (1933); Hight v. City of Harrison-
ville, :328 Mo. 549, 41 S.W.2d 155 (1931).
33. See note 32 supra.
34. See City of Maryville v. Cushman, 363 Mo. 87, 249 S.W.2d 347 (1952).
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case the expenditures would not be proscribed. It would seem the tax-
payer would be subject to no greater burden if the payments are made
to a utility the unit is attempting to purchase.
b. Special Assessment of Benefit Districts
Through the creation of benefit districts local units have found an
effective means of financing desired civic improvements and at the
same time circumventing the constitutional limitation on indebted-
ness.35 The local unit may designate a geographical area within its
limits which is to be the beneficiary of a proposed improvement, such
as roads, sewers, or parks. To finance the construction of these im-
provements, the unit may levy a special assessment against the prop-
erty which is to be benefited. The special assessment does not affect
the general taxable community for whose protection the constitutional
provision was adopted, for it only obligates the local unit to pay with
funds collected from these special assessments.3 c The court, treating
the collection of the special assessment by the unit in the nature of a
condition precedent to the unit's obligation to pay, has consistently
held that this method of financing does not create a debt within the
meaning of the constitutional limitation. The reasoning of the court
is clearly illustrated in Kansas City v. Ward,3 7 where the court stated
that since the city was obligated to pay only to the extent of the sums
collected from the special assessment, it was merely an agent of the
creditors to collect the special assessments.
It is submitted that such reasoning enables the local unit to circum-
vent the spirit, if not the letter of the constitutional limitation.38 For
example, suppose a unit which does not have a sewerage system desires
to construct one, the cost of which would greatly exceed the constitu-
tional limitation. By dividing the unit into separate sewerage benefit
districts and levying special assessments, the unit is able to do in-
directly that which it could not constitutionally accomplish directly.
35. See State ex rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Smith, 342 Mo.
365, 115 S.W.2d 816 (1938); Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 48 S.W. 860(1898); Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S.W. 600 (1896).
It has also been held that housing authority obligations are not debts of the
city. Bader Realty and Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 358 Mo. 747,
217 S.W.2d 489 (1949).
36. In Te State ex rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer Dist., supra note 35;
Embree v. Kansas City & Liberty Boulevard Road Dist., 257 Mo. 593, 618, 166
S.W. 282, 289 (1914).
37. 134 Mo. 172, 35 S.W. 600 (1896).
38. See Holmes, supra note 9, at 100-01.
If a special corporate district is formed, however, it is itself bound by Mo.
CONsT. art. VI, § 26(a). State ex rel. Dalton v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 275 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1955); Bader Realty and Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Housing
Authority, 358 Mo. 747, 217 S.W.2d 489 (1949). See Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo.
569, 8 S.W. 718 (1888) (county cannot levy a special assessment upon the benefit
district beyond the constitutional limit on taxation).
Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 26 (d) has lessened the need for this type of financing by
providing for additional indebtedness for "public improvements-benefit districts
-special assessments."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss1/8
NOTES
2. Conditionality of the Obligation to Pay
a. The Public Utility Lease-A Conditional Obligation
Utilization of the "special fund" doctrine is not the only method
which may be used to finance public improvements and avoid the con-
stitutional limitations. For example, to finance waterworks, power
plants, and other public utilities, the unit may enter into an agreement
whereby it is to lease the utility, usually with an option to buy for a
nominal amount at the end of a specified term of years.3 9
As might be expected from considering the treatment the court has
given to obligations incurred for benefit districts, the court has been
most liberal concerning lease-financing of improvements. 4 If the
court were to construe the aggregate amount that the unit would have
to pay during the life of the lease as the incurrence of a debt upon the
signing of the contract, the aggregate amount could be expected to ex-
ceed current income and revenue if the utility were of any size, and
often exceed the extended five per cent limit as well. Under such a con-
struction, the lease would give rise to a debt proscribed by the consti-
tutional limitation. The court, however, apparently feeling the real
need of the unit for such improvements, has construed the obligation
of the unit not as one of the aggregate amount, but rather as one of
each installment as it becomes due.4 1 This result is reached by viewing
the obligation of the unit to pay as conditional on the rendering of the
service ;42 thus an unconditional obligation is created each year the
service is rendered. Since the annual payment may not cause the unit
to exceed the constitutional limitation, this view allows the unit to
incur a large indebtedness without violating the constitutional restric-
tions. It is submitted, however, that this type of financing is in fact an
attempt to anticipate income of future years. The unit is fairly cer-
tain that it will become obligated to pay in those future years, and
therefore it obligates funds not yet collected. If the purpose of the
constitutional limitation is to put the unit on the cash basis, the pro-
.Y. Lamar Water & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 MIo. 188, 31 S.W. 756
(1895); Saleno v. City of Neosho, 127 Mo. 627, 30 S.W. 190 (1895).
40. Although the court's policy toward lease-financing is liberal today it has
not always been so. The early attempts to use this method of financing were
hell invalid on the ground that they created debts proscribed by the constitution.
ILamar Water & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lamar, 26 S.W. 1025 (Mo. 1894),
rev,! b*q ,'ozart en bane, 128 Mo. 188, 31 S.W. 756 (1895); State ex rel. Robinson
v. Town of Columbia, 111 Mo. 365, 20 S.W. 90 (1892). For a discussion calling
foi clarification of this point, see Skinker, Constitutional Limitations on Munici-
pal Taxation in Mlissouri, 6 ST. Louis L. R-r. 61 (1921).
41. Saleno v. City of Neosho, 127 Mo. 627, 30 S.W. 190 (1895). See also Kan-
sas City Power & Light Co v. Town of Carrollton, 346 Mo. 802, 142 S.W.2d 849
(1!)40).
42. A debt is understood to be an unconditional promise to pay a fixed sum
at some specific time, and is quite different from a contract to be per-
formed in the future, depending upon a condition precedent, which may
never be performed, and which cannot ripen into a debt until performed.
I n re Saleno, supra at 639, 30 S.W. at 192.
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vision should apply to this type of financing which seems to be in the
nature of a credit transaction. 43 Thus, it seems the court is placing
form over substance in an effort to reach a desired result.
b. Otker Contingent Obligations
As shown above, the court may permit the constitutional limitation
to be circumvented by treating the obligation of the unit as contingent
upon performance of another party or upon the happening of an
event, rather than as an absolute obligation to pay. The "contingent
obligation" doctrine is not restricted to the field of public utility leas-
ing. In Tate v. School Dist.,- for example, the school board executed
a contract with a teacher in December for services to be performed
the following year-payment to be monthly "for services properly
rendered." The contract was found to be executory and the unit's
liability contingent on the teacher rendering personal services. The
court said "executory and contingent contracts which are to be per-
formed in futuro do not constitute an indebtedness against the [local
unit] ... in the sense of constitutional inhibition, until such contracts
have been performed."45 If the court had held that the debt created
by the execution of the contract in December was the aggregate
amount of the monthly payments, the unit would have incurred an
obligation exceeding its current revenue and income so that the con-
tract would have involved anticipation of revenue of future years. In
City of Lebanon v. Schneider," the city was to pay into a revenue
fund, created to retire revenue bonds which had been issued to finance
a public waterworks, if the revenue collected from other users was in-
sufficient. If the obligation had been held to be absolute, the "special
fund" doctrine would have been inapplicable since the unit would
,have an unconditional obligation to replenish the "special fund" with
tax funds. The court, however, held that the liability of the general
revenue of the city was merely contingent, and consequently, a debt
was not created within the meaning of the constitutional limitation.
Query if this is not putting form over substance, as in the public
utility lease situation, to achieve a desired result.7
43. See Missouri Toncon Culvert Co. v. Butler County, 352 Mo. 1184, 181
S.W.2d 506 (1944) ; Hawkins v. Cox, 334 Mo. 640, 66 S.W.2d 539 (1933).
44. 324 Mo. 477, 23 S.W.2d 1013 (1929).
45. Id. at 501, 23 S.W.2d at 1024.
46. 349 Mo. 712, 163 S.W.2d 588 (1942).
47. At present it is not clear whether the court will allow a unit to purchase
needed services from a utility financed with the use of the "special fund" doc-
trine. See text supported by notes 29-31 supra. It seems that the same argument
.- replenishing the "special fund" with tax revenue invalidates the "special fund"
-would lie in the present situation. Furthermore, the contingency is not the
performance of service usually relied on, but an inability of the utility to be
financed from the "fund."
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c. Unconditional Obligations
When the court has found the obligation to be absolute and uncon-
ditional, the constitutional inhibition on indebtedness has been strictly
applied. In Book v. Earl,4 one of the first cases involving indebtedness
of local governments to be decided under the Constitution of 1875, the
unit entered into a contract in 1881 for additions to, and remodeling
of, its courthouse; the work was to be done in 1881. At the time war-
rants were issued, the current revenue for the year had already been
exceeded by expenses. Consequently, the court found anticipation of
revenue of future years and held the contract void.49
Apparently, the possibility of circumventing the constitutional limi-
tation if the obligation was conditional rather than absolute encour-
aged the local governments to attempt to effect various absolute pur-
chases by the use of transactions similar to a leasing arrangement.
For example, to obtain funds to construct a county courthouse and
poorhouse, and to remodel a jail, a county issued and sold bonds, the
value of which was twice current revenue and income. It was held
that an absolute obligation was created upon negotiation of the bonds
-payment thereon was not contingent upon beginning work on, or
completion of, the projects.5° Also, an attempt by a unit to delay pay-
ment for construction of a bridge by issuing warrants in the year the
bridge was completed rather than in the previous year when the unit
became contractually obligated to pay, has been held to be an invalid
debt in the year the warrants were issued.5 1 In Missouri Toncon Cul-
v ,, Co. v. Butler County,12 the unit, unable to pay for culvert material
in the year in which it contracted to buy, provided that it was not to
be billed until the following year. The court found that there could
not possibly be a contingent obligation since the vendor had fully per-
formed by delivering the material in the year of contracting, and
therefore the obligation anticipated revenue of future years. Thus,
the court has held that attempts to delay payment where the obliga-
tion is absolute-the only contingency being the passing of time-are
prohibited by the constitution. The court, by looking to the substance
rather than the form, is effectively applying the constitutional pro-
vision in these cases.
48. 87 Mo. 246 (1885).
419. The court said that the purpose of the provision was "to abolish . . . the
credit system and establish the cash system by limiting the . ..expenditures in
any given year to the amount of revenue... for that year." Id. at 252. See also
Anderson v. Ripley County, 181 Mo. 46, 80 S.W. 263 (1904).
50. State x rel. Christian County v. Gordon, 265 Mo. 181, 176 S.W. 1 (1915).
51. Trask v. Livingston County, 210 Mo. 582, 109 S.W. 656 (1908). Plaintiff
was a holder of the county's warrants issued in 1890-the same year the warrants
for the bridge were issued. If the warrants for the bridge were valid, then plain-
tiff's were invalid because the ones for the bridge were prior in time and there
was not sufficient revenue to pay both. See also Ebert v. Jackson County, 70
S.W.2d 918 (Mo. 1934) ; Hawkins v. Cox, 334 Mo. 640, 66 S.W.2d 539 (1933).
52. 352 Mo. 1184, 181 S.W.2d 506 (1944).
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A remaining problem is to determine how far the framers intended
to put the unit on the cash basis. It should be recalled that the con-
stitutional provisions provide that the unit shall not become indebted
in an amount which exceeds the income and revenue for the year plus
any unencumbered balances from previous years, or, on approval of
the qualified voters, in an amount which exceeds five per cent of as-
sessed property valuation. Assume that a unit incurs a debt which at
the time of incurrence could have been discharged out of current reve-
nue or income, or, if not, could have been met by unexpended balances
carried over from previous years. Assume further that the unit fails
to use these unexpended funds to pay the debt, planning to make pay-
ment in future years. Is this anticipation of future revenue within
contemplation of the constitutional provision? In the case of Grand
River Township v. Cook Sales & Service, Inc.,"3 the unit had agreed to
purchase a road grader in 1951, payments to be made in 1952 and
1953. The machines were continually breaking down and the unit
sued to rescind the contract. The court, without qualification and
without having determined if there were sufficient funds in 1951 to
discharge the entire purchase price, stated that "no contract ... is
valid which obligates it [the unit] to make payments in subsequent
calendar years."54 This decision would indeed put the unit on a cash
basis. A few months later, the court, in State ex rel. Strong v. Cribb,";
held that if there remained in the county treasury sufficient unencum-
bered funds to discharge the entire obligation in the year in which the
unconditional obligation was incurred, it was not "anticipation" to
agree to make payments in future years. A strong dissent by Judge
Hyde questioned the computation of unencumbered funds on hand,
and pointed out that the unit would easily be able to return to the
credit basis as a result of the decision. 6 He reasoned that the unit
could use the unencumbered balance to validate a debt but need not
use the balance to pay the indebtedness, so that the unit could again
use the same funds for validating other installment contracts. He
argued that the majority position was not a holding that incurrence
53. 267 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. 1954). The court indicated that it would not be bound
by the "title" of a contract in determining the relationship established. That is,
although a contract was denominated a lease, they would look to the substance to
determine if it was a lease or a contract of purchase.
54. Id. at 325.
55. 273 S.W.2d 246 (Mo. 1954). A similar ruling is found in Shiedley v.
Lynch, 95 Mo. 487, 8 S.W. 434 (1888) (semble).
56. Judge Hyde pointed out the fallacies of the majority opinion: Evidence
showed that the county was already obligated on two other leases in the aggre-
gate of $16,000 yearly, and this should have been taken into consideration in
determining whether there were unencumbered funds available to meet this con-
tract. Further, the court did not earmark the funds to this contract, but left all
county funds available to meet other obligations which the county court might
lawfully direct to be paid. Perhaps Judge Hyde has pointed out another phrase
in Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 26(a) which will call for judicial determination in the
future, i.e., "unencumbered balance."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss1/8
NOTES
of indebtedness per se encumbers the funds. If Judge Hyde is correct,
the effect of the constitutional provision is now nil. However, if the
incurrence of indebtedness is considered as an encumbrance on the
funds-a point which calls for clarification by the court-it is sub-
mitted that the unit will remain on the cash basis.
d. Issuance of Bonds
While bonds create unconditional obligations, it is generally held
that "special purpose" bonds do not create debts. When dealing with
bonds issued to pay judgments-judgment debt bonds-however, the
court has not been consistent in holding that they create valid obliga-
tions. In State ex rel. Clark County v. Hacknan,57 the issue was
whether the constitutional provision could be construed to authorize a
unit to issue bonds, not whether the amount of the bonds exceeded the
constitutional limitation. The court reasoned that since the provision
recognized the unit's power to become indebted, the unit could become
obligated by issuing bonds. However, the phraseology that no unit
shall "become" indebted was construed by the court to mean that the
debt to be incurred by the bond issue must be a new one and not merely
a substitute for an old one. Therefore, the court, to be fair to judgment
creditors, held that the bonds when sold create new debts, notwith-
standing the fact that the funds thereof would be used to discharge
prior obligations.-" While this case was in the appellate court the
legislature granted authority to the units to issue bonds to pay judg-
ment debts." In State ex rel. City of Sedalia v. Weinrieh,o the city,
in accord with the new statute, issued bonds to refund a judgment
debt for overdue water rentals. Following the rationale of the Hack-
man case, that the issuance created a new debt, the city would have
exceeded its constitutional debt limitation. It was held that there was
not the creation of new indebtedness, but merely a change in form.
-7. 280 Mo. 686, 218 S.W. 318 (1920). The obligations to be retired resulted
from spending the anticipated, rather than the actual, revenue of the year.
County courts may anticipate the revenue of the current year. See State ex Tel.
Rothrum v. Darby, 245 Mo. 1002, 137 S.W.2d 532 (1940). See also State ex rel.
Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 162 Mo. 621, 63 S.W. 390 (1901), to the effect that wvar-
rants valid when issued are not invalidated merely because the funds were less
than anticipated.
58. To illustrate the point the court said:
If I owe John Jones $1,000, evidenced by my note, I am indebted to him. If
when that note reaches maturity . . . I go to John Smith and give him my
note for $1,000 ... I have created a new debt .... The obligation or debt in
one instance was to Jones, but in the other it is to Smith .... [The latter
is] a new debt.
State ,./ rd. Clark County v. Hackman, 280 Mo. 686, 703, 218 S.W. 318, 322
(1920).
The analysis in this case, known as the "dual debt" test, has been severely
criticized. See, e.g., State ex rel. Consol. School Dist. v. Smith, 43 Mo. 288, 121
S.W.2d 160 (1938).
59. See Mo. REV. STAT. C. 15, § 2892 (1929).
60. 291 Mo. 461, 236 S.W. 872 (1922).
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Hackman was distinguished on the ground that the proceeds from the
bonds in that case would be used subsequently to discharge existing
indebtedness, whereas in the Sedalia case, payment and extinguish-
ment of the existing debt preceded or was simultaneous with any obli-
gation on the bonds,,1 and therefore the issuance was not a new debt.
Since, however, the statute allows the bonds to be sold first and then
the proceeds to be applied to the extinguishment of the old debt, it is
submitted that the court unnecessarily distinguished the Hackman
case, and should have expressly overruled it-it had outlived its use-
fulness.
The Hackman case remains to plague the court. In State ex rel. Con-
sol. School Dist. v. Smith,62 the unit sought to issue bonds for the
purpose of refunding outstanding bonds. The court held this was not
the creation of new indebtedness within the meaning of the constitu-
tional limitation but merely a change in form of the existing debt; it
makes no difference whether the refunding bonds are exchanged for
outstanding bonds or are sold for cash and the proceeds used for re-
deeming outstanding bonds. Instead of overruling the Hackman case,
the court agreed with the result. The court reasoned that because the
voters had a right to vote on incurrence of indebtedness and since they
apparently did not vote on the warrants to be refunded in the Hack-
man case, it might be the debts were not in fact the same; thus, there
might not be a mere "change in form." The Constitution of 1945
settled the problem in part by authorizing the issuance of refunding
bonds to refund outstanding bonded indebtedness. 6 3 It is submitted
that the court should expressly overrule the Hackman case and an-
nounce that the constitutional restriction does not apply to bonds
issued to retire valid outstanding obligations of the local unit.
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of the constitutional limitation on indebted-
ness of local units in Missouri is to avoid excessive taxation which
may result from corruption and/or ineconomy in a local government.
The court has correctly limited the application of the provision to con-
tractual obligations incurred in the performance of discretionary
duties.64 Also, the court has wisely frustrated attempts by the local
61. But see State ex rel. Consol. Dist. C-4 v. Holmes, 362 Mo. 1018, 245 S.W.2d
882 (1952) (bonds create debts, not when they are sold, but when authorized by
election).
62. 343 Mo. 288, 121 S.W.2d 160 (1938).
63. Refunding bonds.-For the purpose of refunding, extending, and uni-
fying the whole or any part of its valid bonded indebtedness any ...
subdivision of the state... may issue refunding bonds ....
MO. CONST. art. VI, § 28.
64. A trend in the recent decisions appears to remove "debts of law" from the
operation of the constitutional limitation. See text supported by notes 17-20
supra.
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units to return to the credit basis when the units have incurred un-
conditional obligations with payment postponed until future years. It
is submitted, however, that the court has been unduly liberal in de-
termining what constitutes a conditional obligation, and consequently,
has permitted circumvention of the provisions. The court, moved by
the argument of the local units' need for "necessaries," has been quick
to label financial transactions "conditional," thus giving rise to obli-
gations not prohibited by the constitution. (This liberalism is not
confined to the court, but is apparent also in the Constitution of
1945.F) The recent decision in State ex rel. Strong v. Cribb ignored
the "conditional" test and, it would seem, makes the sole requirement
for validity the ability of the unit to pay the entire amount at the time
of contracting. The fallacy is that the unit may elect not to pay until
subsequent years, and thus, as the obligation may not encumber the
funds on hand, the same funds may be used to validate other con-
tracts. Under such a rationale the sky would seem to be the limit on
the local units' power to incur obligations. It is submitted that when
the court is again faced with the problem it should restrict, or better
yet, eliminate, this possibility of circumventing the constitution: A
working definition of "unencumbered funds," based on a full dis-
closure of all the outstanding obligations of the unit, will accomplish
the purpose.
RONALD M. BELT
65. Compare Mo. CONST. art. VI (1945), with Mo. CONST. art. X (1875).
Washington University Open Scholarship
